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The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel wishes to express its thanks
for the contribution to this annual report by Robert D. Rothi. Bob
was a consultant to and a member of the Panel from August 16, 1982
to his untimely death November 27, 1983.
All of us came to know Bob as a friend, a colleague, and a
sincere, intelligent, practitioner of the engineering art. We
remember him as he would have wished, with pleasure rather than
sorrow, and extend to his family our sympathy as well as our
gratitude for having known him.
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ANNUAL REPORT COVERING ACTIVITIES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1983
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INTRODUCTION
The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has completed its
assessment of NASA's safety performance for 1983 and affirms that NASA 	 j
Headquarters and Center management teams continue to hold the safety
of manned flight to be their prime concern, and that essential effort
and resources are allocated for maintaining safety in all of the
development and operational programs. The Aerospace Safety Advisory 	 ^.
Panel continues to have access to NASA management at all levels and
has found no difficulty in obtaining available data from any of NASA's
policy, development, test or operational activities to assist in the
evaluation of safety performance.
During 1983, NASA programs for the operational use of the Space
Transportation System and their continuing use of aircraft for
training, experimentation, and administrative service demanded the
largest share of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's attention, and
this report addresses those problems which the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel believes are in need of focused attention.
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In this report, the Panel has listed those conclusions most worthy
of NASA management concentration along with our recommendations for
action. Following these broad conclusions and recommendations are two
sections one of which is a review and closeout of NASA's response to
the 1982 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel suggestions and the other of
which offers comments on some broad NASA activities which have had and
probably will have an impact on the safety of future systems and their
operation. Finally, since the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
conclusions have been derived from substantial detail investigations
of the hardware itself, its testing, and its use, an appendix has been
added which includes information on Panel studies and reviews which
have contributed to the primary conclusions.
It should be recognized that the transition from R&D flying of the
i
Space Transportation System to its operational use introduces many
opportunities for management policies and actions to expedite the
achievement of maximum safety. Thus, many of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel comments have to do with the management approach to
operational status for the Space Transportation System. It appears
that much needs to be done before the Space Transportation System can
achieve the reliability necessary for safe, high rate, low cost
operations.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMME•.NDATIONS
1. Product Quality and Utility
Conclusion: Although present quality assurance programs are
thorough, and documentation extensive, the Panel believes that these
conventional approaches could be augmented by more motivational
emphasis in the development and production phases of hardware and
software. The Panel believes that more emphasis should be placed aty
the contractor and subcontractor level on design suitability and
production quality to complement the present quality assurance
programs. This emphasis should include motivation of the entire Space
Transportation System (STS) design team now addressing improvements to
be certain that operational problems are alleviated through these
design improvements and elements of the STS which are difficult to
inspect, involve obsolete technology, or require frequent maintenance
and replacement are changed.
Recommendation: NASA make a concerted effort to assist
contractors and subcontractors to produce the highest quality of
product, oriented toward operational suitability. NASA and contractor
employees, both design and production, should now be approaching their
work on subsequent hardwire improvements with operational suitability
rather than increased performance as the dominant goal.
2. Shuttle System Main Engine (SSME)
Conclusion: The current design of the SSME, with the exception of
the turbomachinery, appears to be suitable, assuming satisfactory
completion of the specified acceptance tests, for approximately seven
flights at full power level (FPL), i.e., 1098 of the original rated
power level (RPL). The current high pressure turbopumps at this
rating of 1098 are, apparently, suitable for only one or two flights
at 1098 thrust before removal for teardown inspection and possible
replacement is required.
3
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The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) agrees with the prudent
decision to limit the operation of these engines to the 1046 thrust
level as this mitigates but does not eliminate the problems of the
engine turbomachines and provides operating margin. The engines have
performed well during the 1983 flights at the 1046 level confirming
the wisdom of selecting this cof^straint.
The SSME project has adopted a three-phase program to develop a longer
life expectancy for the engine. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
has reviewed this program and supports and commends this organized
approach to SSME improvement.
Recommendation: The SSME program should proceed with full NASA
support and resources to firm up the content and planning for SSME
improvement and to implement the program and pursue the objectives
vigorously. Retrofit of certified improvements during scheduled or
	 i
unscheduled removals of the engines is firmly recommended. The plans 	 1
should continue to include the activity on a full redesign of the high	 i
pressure turbomachines that was begun this year. The Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel believes this effort to be necessary to achieve the
margin of safety required for routine operations and long life of the
engine.	 i
i
As testing to demonstrate margin for operation at the 1096 level will
involve operation at thrust levels higher than 1096, there will be
temptation to increase the Shuttle performance by utilizing higher
thrust. The ASAP advises strongly against such a decision.
Operational reliability, and the concommitant safety can be achieved
only by operating the engines at thrust levels below the maximum
demonstrated in a few tests to show that a margin exists. 	 r
3. Landing Gear
Conclusion: In a number of previous reports and discussions, the
ASAP has suggested that the landing gear on the Orbiter has not been
4
designed with enough structural and functional margin for repetitive
use. The response to the suggestions contained in the 1992 report
does not appear to the Panel to have answered the fundamental question
of achieving suLficient margins for operational reliability and
safety.
Recommendation: A complete structural and mechanical suitability
review of the Shuttle landing gear be made by an engineering
organization with commercial transport experience for the purpose of
suggesting alternative landing gear configurations and setting target
margins for structures and the wheels, brakes, and axles. This review
should include but not be limited to:
a. The practicality of converting to a four-wheel main gear
truck within the present wheel well.
b. The practicality of putting an extended or extendable
strut on the nose gear for the purpose of changing the
Orbiter ground attitude (more positive angle of attack),
thus relieving the main gear roll-out loads.
C.	 The feasibility of increasing brake capacity by a major	 i
percentage (at least 258).
d.	 A thorough review of the weak points on the present gear
followed by suggestions for beef-up to bring the margins
into partial comparability with the margins of modern
transport aircraft in the landing mode.
1	 4. Logistics and Maintenance
Conclusions: During 1983 the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has
observed considerable progress in the areas of logistics, maintenance,
supply and support programs intended to avoid launch delays due to
material shortages. Suitable directives are being developed to
encourage liaison between United States Air Force and National
5
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Aeronautics and Space Administration through a co-ordinating group
F;	 known as the Integrated Logistics Panel (ILP).
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel applauds the award of the Shuttle
Processing Contract (SPC) in October 1983 but would welcome a clear
definition of its role and responsibilities in the logistics field.
Plans for transition of logistics and support activities from Marshall
Space Flight Center and Johnson Space Center to Kennedy Space Center
are in existence but are proceeding slowly and are not scheduled for
completion until 1986.
There is no evidence of a long-term overall maintenance plan for the
entire Shuttle system. Additionally, some doubt exists as to whom the
ultimate responsibility for logistics really belongs and this is
clouding the improving liaison between United States Air Force and
National Aeronuatics and Space Administration. This may, in part, be
due to the non-existence of a single cop authority over combined
USAF-NASA logistics. A stronger hand from NASA Headquarters in
Washingtc., would probably help. Both recommendations, that is, for
the maintenance master plan and the appointment of a "czar" have been
made previously by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and valuable
time is being lost during which some clarity and resolution could have
been introduced into the entire logistics progam.
There appear to be some major voids in the logistics programs as
presently envisaged. For example, no mandate exists for exploring the
adequacy and suitability of logistics programs for Spacelab, Centaur,
Inertial Upper Stage or Payload Assist Module systems.
The payloads can contribute to launch delays just as significantly as
the Orbiter if logistical support is not considered as an entire
system.
6
Recommendations:
a. A single authority be established responsible for all
logistics systems.
b. An overall maintenance plan be established attempting to
provide for at least the next decade.
C.	 The role of the Shuttle Processing Contractor in the
vital sphere of logistics should be cleary defined as
soon as possible.
d.	 Spacelab, Centaur, Inertial Upper Stage, and Payload
Assist Module should be included in the logistics plans.
5. Orbiter Structural Loads
1
Conclusion: The most current structural loads for the Shuttle
wort. :'r,:-ived in 1976/1977 and are called the ASKA 5.4 loads. The
i
rr.e.,yer flight test data that has been acquired to date does not
validate the ASKA 5.4 loads. To operate the Orbiter up to its safe
strength with confidence, aerodynamic loads in ascent and thermal
loads in descent need to be better defined.
Recommendation: The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, recommends
that National Aeronautics and Space Administration expedite the
derivation of a new set of loads based on the latest wind tunnel and
flight data. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel further recommends
that renewed efforts be made to validate the final derived structural
loads with full-scale flight data.
6. Orbiter Landing Speed and Pitch Control
Conclusion: Orbiter flights to date have demonstrated high
landing speeds, landing gear loads near the design 'limits, many brake
malfunctions, and a wide scatter in touchdown points.
(^I
7
Handling-quality tests on simulators have verified the sensitivity and
inherent instability in pitch control that contribute to the Orbiter's
problems.
Excessive landing speed and control sensitivity result in:
a. A continuing potential for a landing accident to occur
b. Limitations on choice of abort sites
C.	 Risk of destructive brake malfunctions
d. Non-survivable open sea ditchings
e. Lengthy and expensive training programs.
Program management apparently recognizes the above, as evidenced by a
reluctance to use the Kennedy Space Center landing strip despite the
logistic and turnaround advantages resulting from its use. The ASAP
concludes that a major reduction in landing velocity, and an
improvement in the apparent stability (and consistency) in pitch
control near the touch down point, would substantially improve the
operational flexibility and safety potential for the Orbiter.
Recommendation: NASA Headquarters should request Langley Research
Center (LaRC) to review the "state of the art" in canard configured
aircraft, and prepare briefings to the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
and NASA Headquarters on the advantages and limitations of canard
configurations as applied to the Orbiter. In parallel, Johnson Space
Center (JSC) should be asked to explore the practical problems of
installing controllable canards on the Orbiters for use in landing.
7. Shuttle Processina Contractor (S
Conclusion: Although it is too early to reach any definitive
judgments as to the operational effectiveness of the Shuttle
Processing Contractor (SPC), Lockheed Space Operations Company, the
planning, preparation, and initial actions during the transition
period take account of concerns raised by the Panel in earlier
reports. To date, Lockheed has been generally successful in hiring
8
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key personnel of contractors which have been responsible for
processing operations. It is important that this success rate be
maintained among the contractors--Rockwell International, Martin
Marietta, United Space Boosters--whose final transition dates occur
after STS-11 in early 1984. In addition, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration can assist the Shuttle Processing Contractor in
carrying out its responsibilities through such actions as moving
toward a unified logistics system, acquiring an adequate number of
spares, defining major and minor overhaul sequences, developing
coordinated launch schedules for Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberg
Air Force Base, and consulting closely with the Shuttle Processing
Contractor on major hardware acquisitions and enhancements that relate
to Shuttle processing. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel will
F	 continue to monitor closely Lockheed's assumption of these critical
processing responsibilities.
Recommendation: National. Aeronautics and Space Administration i
should clarify as rapidly as possible its internal organizational
arrangements that will support routine operation of the Space
Transportation System. Such organizational clarity will be a major
factor in achieving the objectives noted above and in assisting the
SPCI
r
8. Safety of Flight Operations
Conclusions: Nineteen hundred and eighty-three was a significant
year in the evolution of flight safety for the aircraft used at the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Centers. Flight safety
has received considerable attention at the highest levels. The
revitalization of the Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel (IAOP) and
the many constructive recommendations from the ECOsystems
International Inc., and internal reviews should be effective in
enhancing safety of flight operations. Still lacking are:
9
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a. Effective communication both up and down the management
chain, on flight safety matters, from Headquarters to
the flight operations level at the centers
b. A "Director of Flight Operations" or the equivalent in
NASA Headquarters
	
C.	 An appreciation at the Headquarters level of the role of
human factors in aviation accidents
	
d.	 An update of Headquarters aircraft and flight operations
policies and management instructions.
Recommendations: A "Director" or "Chief" of Flight Operations
should be identified and should be the focal point of flight safety
matters in NASA Headquarters.
This "Director" should serve as a channel of communication from the
branch flight operations level at the Centers to whatever
administrative level that is necessary to fully resolve a flight 	 w
safety problem.
National Aeronautics and Space Administratation Headquarters through
the "Chief of Flight Operations" and the Intercenter Aircraft
Operations Panel should complement the supervision of flight
operations with studies and educational programs aimed at the human
factcr problem in aviation accidents and assure that appropriate
policy documents are issued by Headquarters to meet operational safety
needs.
10
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PROGRAM ASSESSMENT
Product Quality and Utility
Together National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
'	 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel have concerned themselves with the
effectiveness of the "Product Quality Assurance Program" and its
adequacy to support the safety performance of the manned space flig;.t
program. During the history of the STS development a body of
procedures, reports and records has grown up that defines in detail
the route to be followed in the manufacture of already designed
hardware. The pattern developed does not always result in suitable
hardware. Another product of the system has been a documented history
that will allow later analysis to pinpoint the cause after failure has
occurred. This paperwork system and its implementation is massive and
hence costly but it is not clear that it directly affect hardware
adequacy. In a recent review of quality assurance held at Marshall
Space Flight Center covering contractors and subcontractors, hundreds
of deviations from prescribed product assurance procedures were
reviewed. In spite of these deviations, all contractors stated that
there had been no hardware impact. Now that the hardware task is
becoming more one of replacing and fixing, it is important to put
emphasis on the development engineering needed to insure that
equipment that has been found wanting either in suitability or life
under operational conditions is properly designed for operation. The
achievement of appropriate operational design and the motivation of
workers to produce to that design are essential to make traditional
duality assurance programs worth the cost.
The ASAP did not perceive sufficient emphasis on directing actual
worker attention to those things that, in fact, affect the quality of
the work to be done. There is no intention here to imply that the
whole body of product quality assurance is not valuable but we believe
that it should be complemented by more attention to operational
engineering and to the production system itself to insure that each
I
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piece of hardware produced is as near perfect as possible and that it
is of an appropriate design for the operational era. Quality
assurance does not make hardware--a worker does, and quality assurance
is only one of his tools. It should be remembered that STS elements
for the most part come from small production, not mass produced items
which are susceptible to more automated quality controls. Product
quality for such small production is basically a function of the
producing organization not the quality assurance organization. Thus,
a product of integrity demands:
o	 Suitable design
o	 Proper tools and instructions
o	 Worker education
o	 Worker motivation
The first of these factors is in a large part a result of the
I. engineering which reflects experience and management dedication to
u	 operational utility. The second quality assurance factor is the
provision of proper tools, fixtures, and jigs calibrated to the extent 	 o
necessary. Inspection equipment should be available as necessary and
all prints and procedures must be current and explicit. It might help
if a given worker had only the paper of importance to his job. Large 	 0'
data packs all of which do not concern the individual worker tend to
obsure the importance to him of the few pieces of paper relevant to
his particular task.
The third factor, worker education, is more important than most
people realize. The majority of the workers on NASA projects either
in engineering or production are conscientious, qualified, and
intelligent people who want to do a good job. Every effort must be
made to acquaint them with the importance, use, and characteristics of
F	
the equipment they are working on and the critical parameters that
must be controlled. For instance, in some cases cleanliness may be
simply good housekeeping and in other cases, such as hardware exposed
to propellants or oxygen, it may be absolutely vital. The worker
should know why certain procedures are demanding if he is expected to
12
4
4P
produce a perfect product. Astronauts make visits to production
facilities and this certainly motivates people. It might also be in
order to have some of NASA's key engineering personnel conduct
in-plant seminars on specific equipment and specific qualities it must
have to do its intended job.
'	 Finally, worker motivation beginning with the engineer is a
difficult but rewarding task. The proper communications and
communicators serve both an educational and motivational purpose.
Quality circles are a useful technique so long as they do not produce
unauthorized or untested changes in hardware or procedures. Along
another line the worker must not depend on the inspector for quality;
the inspector must simply confirm the worker's performance. The
worker determines the quality of the product and each worker must be
carefully reminded of this time and time again.
f
A new factor in product quality now faces NASA design and
production practitioners who must produce reliable replacement
hardware--particularly electronic. The designs of most of the Shuttle
components are at least 10 years old and as industry has progressed
new developments and design concepts have produced better and more 	
a
reliable products. This coupled with difficulty in the reproduction
of older style units, suggests that design change may be essential in
achieving functional reliability. The problem that this aging poses
for the Shuttle is that NASA cannot allow changes in design or
substitutions in components without requalification of the hardware
and a very comprehensive consideration of the effects of the change.
It would seem to be in order for the Centers to determine in advance
the extent of obsolescence, cost versus reliability improvements, the
"delta" qualification requirements necessary for such updated
equipment and establish a prioritized plan for determining the
equipment to be replaced by that containing more modern technology.
13
Flight Readiness Review Changes
The Panel feels that in light of experience the Flight Readiness
Review (FRR) process could be restructured to save some resources and,
importantly from a safety point of view, to place the FRR operational
decisions in the operations organization.
Panel members have participated in the majority, if not all of the
Flight Readiness Reviews either in person or through telecons. These
reviews have historically involved senior NASA management, senior
program managers, numerous contractor managers, and with the pre-FRR
Center meetings, almost the entire Space Transportation System (STS)
mid-management population of NASA and their contractors. This effort
is costly not only in travel and time but from the standpoint that a
large number of senior people will not be doing other urgent things.
With time and experience such priorities should have changed. As the
operation becomes more routine, safety is enhanced by organizational
clarity and the motivation produced by more precise definition of
responsibilities.
i
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel feels that it is time for the
STS Flight Readiness Review process to be restructured. We suggest a
format for the change only to stimulate discussion and accelerate
decision. We fee]. that the Centers should continue to hold their a
"Pre-FRR" meetings and generate a Center readiness position. This
should identify current problems, new risks, changes in old risks and
other factors affecting readiness. We further suggest that the
decision responsibility for flight readiness be delegated to the
designated Director for Shuttle Operations wherever NASA decides to
locate him, at Kennedy Space Center, at Johnson Space Center or at
NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C. after consultation with the Center
Directors. We feel that such change would be more effective in the
majority of the operations and would improve the motivation and
quality of the NASA organization and its contractors.
j
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Shuttle Processing Contract (SPC)
NASA's decision to consolidate under a single contractor all
ground processing and launch and landing services, including operation
and maintenance of associated ground systems, is a major step in the
direction of achieving a genuine operational space transportation
system. The scope of the Shuttle Processing Contractor's (SPC)
responsibility is broad, including the processing of individual STS
elements (Orbiter vehicle including main engines, external tank, solid
rocket boosters), integration of these elements in preparation for
launch, performance of on-line cargo integration and interface
validation, and operation and maintenance of facilities and equipment
required for processing, launch, post-launch, landing and de-servicing
of the Shuttle vehicle. The activities of twelve (12) contractors are
being consolidated under the SPC.
In September 1983, NASA awarded the Shuttle Processing Contract to
the Lockheed Space Operations Company. The Lockheed team also
includes Grumman Technical Services, Inc., Morton-Thiokol, Inc., and
Pan American World Services, Inc.
Assigned individuals from the Panel have monitored the activities
leading to the selection of the Lockheed team and will continue to
follow the contract's implementation. It is essential that the
important objective of achieving a more cost-effective operation (an
operational space transportation system) not be permitted to introduce
unacceptable risks to the Shuttle crew or the vehicle system itself.
In striving for this proper balance between desired cost-effectiveness
and acceptable risk, there is the initial challenge of the SPC
accepting and carrying out the many technically demanding
responsibilities of twelve (12) separate contractors, many of whom
were developers of the STS elements. There is also the longer-term
challenge of maintaining rigorous attention to detail and quality when
the STS operation becomes more routine, the flight rate increases, and
cost-control pressures intensify. How the initial challenge of
15
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transition is approached will more than likely lay the groundwork for
solving the longer-term problems associated with truly routine
operations.
Lockheed is presently going forward with transition plans to
assume responsibility for the work performed by the previous
contractors. To date, the transition is essentially on schedule with
assumption of all responsibility at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) to be
complete by February 6, 1984, following the launch of mission 41-B
(STS-11). Lockheed will be totally responsible for the processing of
mission 41-C (STS-13), scheduled for launch in April. At Vandenberg
the transition will take significantly longer with initial operational
capability scheduled for late 1985.
A critical factor in sustaining processing capability will be
Lockheed's success in hiring the key personnel of other contractors. 	
1
As of early December, Lockheed had made 693 employment offers at
Kennedy Space Center and received 672 acceptances. At Vandenberg 	
l ;
there have been 132 offers with 108 acceptances. Of significance is
1
the "capture rate" of personnel actively sought by Lockheed due to
their individual capabilities. This stands (as of early December) at
998 for employees of Boeing Services International, Computer Science
Corp., and RCA Service Company; 848 for Martin Marietta Corp.; and 978
for Planning Research Corporation. It is important that this success
rate be maintained among contractors whose final transition dates
occur after February 7.984. Lockheed estimates that total personnel at
Kennedy Space Center will be reduced by about 1030 at the conclusion
of the transition period from the nearly 5 1 00 persons initially
available. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel recognizes that there
is a small population of highly critical people who because of their
experience and knowledge will be hard to replace, and that Lockheed
should acquire them to further assure a successful transition. The
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel will monitor these essential skill
areas to determine the degree of success achieved.
41
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A major factor in selection of the Lockheed team was the fully
integrated management structure that established clear relationships
between the organizational elements of the Shuttle Processing
Contractor and the work to be performed. Lines of communication,
authority, and responsibility were directly drawn between top
management and the organizational elements. Personnel of other team
members--particularly Grumman--were (and are) integrated throughout
the organization, along with the functional assignment of Vandenberg
Air Force Base operations to Morton-Thiokol, Integrated Ground
Operations to Grumman, and Program Requirements Analysis to Pan Am.
With the transition period approximately at the half-way point, it	 M
is too early to reach any definitive judgment as to the operational
effectiveness of the emerging organization. However, it is possible
to identify certain features or principles of the Lockheed plan that
indicates a recognition of the challenges and problems in both the
near and longer-term. For example:
--A recognition, as stressed by the SPC's top management,
that maintenance and well-being of the work force is essential to
productive and safe operations. High morale among employees and
attention to detail must be sustained for the operational life of
the space transportation system, no matter how routine and
predictable operations become in the later years.
--Creation of an external Safety Advisory Board (modeled in
many respects after the ASAP) that will meet at least quarterly
to examine all aspects of the SPC's operations from a safety
perspective. Direct access to SPC top management is assured.
The desirability of direct communication between this new Safety
Advisory Board and the Panel was informally discussed in
December.
--Recognition of the need for a common logistics system to
support operations at both Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberg
Air Force Base. SPC management currently views logistics as its
most serious and difficult problem. This responsibility is
17
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hampered by NASA's own ambiguity concerning a total logistics,
spares, and maintenance program. The SPC has no responsibility
for ordering or budgeting spares acquisition. It is also not
SPC's responsibility to plan major or minor maintenance
"downtime" for Orbiter refurbishment. This must be resolved if
the logistics system is to adequately support operations.
--An expressed determination to drive operating decisions to
the lowest possible level in order to (1) strengthen
responsibility at the hands-on level and (2) take advantage of
the expertise and knowledge of those persons actually doing the
work. Day-to-Day instructions are not to come from top
management.
--Recognition of the lack of commonality among the Orbiters
and the related assumption that maintenance and logistics
procedures must take these differences into account for the life
0	
of the program.
--The decision to work toward zone-type processing of the
Orbiter where a particular area is worked completely and
closed-out only once, as distinct from the present system of
numerous close-outs as individual systems are processed
separately. Related to this approach is the objective of
assembling all needed instructions and parts in the immediate
location or station where the work is to be performed.
--Establishment of direct links between the SPC's planning
organizations--Program Requirements Analysis, Mission Management
Office, and Software Integration Office--with comparable Level
III entities at NASA. These direct communication channels will
facilitate technical expertise being readily available and
provide channels of information for NASA to observe element
performance and share in the decisions to further simplify
j	 "turnaround" procedures.
I
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These varioiis organizational arrangements and operating
principles will be monitored by the Panel as they are
implemented. Nevertheless, they provide evidence at this
juncture of a management approach that appreciates the continuing
risks and difficulties of Shuttle processing, as well as the
opportunities to develop a more efficient and cost-effective
'	 operation.
NASA'S Support of the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC)
In prior annual reports and in other reports to NASA
management, the Panel has emphasized the importance of moving
toward an organizational arrangement within NASA that takes
account of the special needs of the Shuttle's routine, more
nearly commercial type, operation as distinguished from the prior
research and development effort. In July 1982 we noted, for
example, that a "well-defined and stable organization within NASA
to oversee STS operations is the anchor for the SPC." The
selection of the SPC and initiation of its responsibilities makes	 i
this observation more timely and pertinent than ever.
Last year the Panel suggested that the "organizational
arrangement within NASA that is to be responsible for commerical
operation of the Shuttle should be determined and announced, even
though full implementation of this arrangQmant might not be
feasible for the next several years." The Panel's assessment of
the current status of the Shuttle Processing Contractor indicates
why this recommendation still merits consideration. For example:
--The interim logistics procedure now in effect esoentially
continues control of all flight hardware with Johnson Space
Center and Marshall Space Flight Center. While this arrangement
is appropriate for the immediate period when the SPC is building
its capabilities and establishing a confidence level among NASA
managers, the time is fast approaching when retention of this
control by research and development centers will more than likely
,A&
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impede processing operations. Planning should begin now for an
orderly transfer of this oversight responsibility within NASA to
an STS operations entity.
--A comprehensive maintenance plan for the Orbiter is
lacking. NASA's Operations and Maintenance Instructions (OMI's)
provide maintenance procedures but not a baseline from which
risks can be assessed. Preparation of such a plan would
undoubtedly be a priority-assignment of an STS operations entity,
carried out in collaboration with Johnson Space Center, Marshall
Space Flight Center and the new Shuttle Processing Contractor.
--Operational problems of some magnitude can be expected for
the SPC once the Vandenberg launch facility is activated. For
example, conflicts between NASA and the USAF for priority of
spare parts and perhaps ground support equipment will have to be
resolved if the SPC is to carry out its processing
responsibilities on both coasts. Resolution of these problems
will be facilitated by the exi tence of an STS operations entity
within NASA.
--Flight schedules at KSC and VAFB should be established that
permit the SPC to deploy its hur • an and material resources in a
cost-effective manner.
--The SPC should participate in the review process that leads
to major hardware acquisitions and enhancements that relate to
Shuttle processing activities.
The Panel is encou).aged by the approach and apparent
organizational and technical capabilities of the SPC. The
preparation for this significant step toward achieving a genuine
operational space transportation system has been thorough and
sensibly carried out. Both NASA and the Lockheed team, along
20
with the incumbent contractors, have contributed to this
generally positive situation. As noted above, however, the Panel
will continue to monitor these activities as the SPC assumes its
full responsibilities and as the flight rate accelerates.
i
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NASA RESPONSE TO CALENDAR YEAR 1982 REPORT
The 1982 report of the Aerospace Space Safety Advisory Panel
to NASA contained many references to the transition now taking
place as the Space Transportation System (STS) approaches
operational status. It was the purpose of these 1982 comments to
emphasize to NASA the importance of planning and then creating
the organization, and inventory necessary to support the proposed
increases in rate of STS launches, safely. A concern with any
's	 new system, as important and as complex as this STS, is that the
need to satisfy potential customers drives a development into
g	 changes to improve performance rather than reliability. In
addition, design or procedures simplification may have impact on
performance but could have major influence on the cost, time for
turnaround, and the safety of operations. The general tenor of
NASA's response to the ASAP's 1982 report demonstrated the
continuing strong bias of NASA management to spend the limited
resources on major performance changes and to relegate changes
666	 for reliability and safe reduction of turnaround time to a lower
priority. The ASAP hopes that this bias will not continue.
The Panel has reviewed the NASA response and has discussed
each element of that response in an effort to deduce our own
performance and to plan our future efforts to be more effective.
In the following, point-by-point review of the NASA response, we
offer some measure of self-assessment:
Recommendation 1 - The program for completing all flight test
objectives.
NASA has given us a schedule which should complete the
determination of aerodynamic performance, loads, etc., by mission
51-6 (STS-20). We still feel that this subject deserves high
priority and that flight data are necessary before we fully
understand the structural and performance capability of the STS.
I
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Recommendation 2 - Maintaining structural factors of safety.
NASA's outline of how future flight test information will be
obtained, and its plan for instrumentation appear to be
satisfactory.	 We concur in principle in the exchange of the
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System (FASCOS)	 to replace the
i
Flight Acceleration Monitor Only System (FAMOS)	 for engine j
•
vibration monitoring.
I€€
Recommendation 3 - Single responsible operational logistics
I
organization.
NASA's goal as outlined in SFO-PD-110.5, 	 "NSTS Integrated
Logistics Support Policy," is commendable and the ASAP concurs
W
with it in principle but we feel that the time to develop, 	 and
the lead time to acquire major spares suggests more emphasis is
needed from Headquarters.	 As will be noted elsewhere, 	 the
Shuttle Processing Contract alone does not solve the problem, no
matter how capably the SPC contractors perform. 	 Scheduled major
and minor repair cycles need to be determined and spares ordered.
This is not in the SPC work statement.
Recommendation 4 - Sustaining engineering.1,.
The Panel has not succeeded in presenting a convincing case
ti
to NASA to separate this function from the engineering cadre that
has accomplished the development and is now engaged in the
engineering for performance improvement.	 We still believe it is
timely to make this change.
Recommendation 5 - Hardware/Software certification.
The Panel is pleased that the Chief Engineer's Office is
addressing this policy. When it is available for evaluation the
Panel will meet with the Chief Engineer. The Panel did not make
23
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clear in its recommendation that it was seeking only a policy,
not a summary of what was or was not certified.
Recommendation 6 - Autoland demonstration.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel realizes now that it
pressed prematurely for the demonstration of this system. It is
1	 obvious that the system is not yet acceptable to the astronauts
for full dependence and that a real hazard may exist if the
pilots are required to take over from a malfunctionin g system
j`	 late in the landing sequence.
s
Recommendation 7 - New design for the turbomachinery for the
i
SSME.
NASA's three phase program for improvement and redesign of
the power head and its turbopumps is a most thorough response to 	 i
this problem. The ASAP will follow each phase in the expectation
that subsequent Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) elements will
have enough functional. margin to justify repeated use at the 1098
thrust level now being tested for certification. This subject is
also included in the conclusions and recommendations of this 1983 8	 '
annual report.
Recommendation 8 - Landing gear integrity.
i
}	 The ASAP is not satisfied with the response to its 1982
kd@	suggestion. An expanded discussion of this element of the STS is
included in this, the 1983 annual report.
Recommendation 9 - Structural modifications of Orbiter 102.
NASA must certainly maintain as regular a schedule as
possible of useful Shuttle launches and the ASAP recognizes why
the suggestion to do full structural modifications on Orbiter 102
became impractical. Elsewhere in this report we have noted our
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continuing concern for the structural integrity of the Orbiter at
its full payload capability and we are following NASA's flight
planning to assure ourselves that adequate placards are in place
until the structural loads and strength capability have all been
defined.
Other Issues
Automatic entry and automatic braking:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel accepts NASA's response
that a complete automatic reentry implies many change in ground
control concepts and manual inhibit responsibilities for the
crew, and the Panel agrees that the likelihood of incapacitation
of the entire crew is remote. Such a response does not cover the
more detailed suggestion that automatic gear- deployment and
auto-braking should be considered to provide redundancy at a
critical time.
Role of crew vs. ground control:
NASA response indicates progress toward more autonomous crew
responsibilities and the ASAP commends such efforts. Separating
the various segments of the operation into launch, on orbit and
entry is useful in analyzing crew responsibilities and should be
continued. The ASAP included one other phase in its discussions
and that was the phase of flight readiness prior to launch. It
is the Panel's suggestion that some simplification in procedures,
some added confidence in on-board instrumentation, and some time
saved might be possible if the cockpit were used as a major
readiness check station in much the same manner as the cockpit of
a complex airliner or combat aircraft is used.
25
Safety improvements:
The Panel recognizes that a consistency review of the
redundancy of all the systems and backup systems on the STS is a
monumental undertaking but we all feel that such a review is both
possible and profitable because we believe that simplification of
present systems may be the result (thrust vector control of solid
rocket nozzles may be a good example).
NASA's response which included a review of the 1200 items on
the Critical Item List approaches the Panel's concerns in a
different but perhaps equally effective way. It is hoped that a
critical item review and presentation can be made to the ASAP in
1984.
Noted elsewhere but worthy of repetition is that the Phase I,
II, and III improvement programs in the operational suitability
and spares determination for the Space Shuttle Main Engine is an
example of a well organized approach to safety consistency. The
	
	 I 'j
Panel suggests a similar program for other major subsystems of
the STS such as the auxiliary power unit.
26
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Appendix 1
SAFETY OF FLIGHT OPERAT:.ONS
Nineteen hundred eighty-three was a sig.iificant year in the
evolution of the management of flight safety in NASA aircraft
operations.
The good aspects were: (1) the revitalization of the
Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel (IAOP), (2) the
reorganization in NASA Headquarters that established the Aircraft
Management Office (A.MO) as the single office for directives and
policy leadership for aircraft operations, and (3) the
constructive recommendations from ECOsystems International, Inc.
which reinforced many of the previously reported findings of the
NASA in-house review teams. An organizational entity such as the
AMO could improve what appears to be poor communication from the
9
general management level to and from the flight operations level
at the Centers.	 i
The IAOP, through its panels and subgroups, met several times
culminating in a full panel meeting at NASA Headquarters in the
fall of 1983. The Headquarters staff presented a compendium of 	 L
the recommendations from NASA in-house reviews, accident and
incident reports, and reviews by ECOsystems International, Inc.
The meeting closed with an admonition from the chairman to get on
with the job of correcting any deficiencies in management for
which they had responsibility. As a result of the IAOP work,
changes in supervisory procedures and practices have been made at
the Center level.
Evidence of poor communication with Headquarters can be
deduced from some of the recommendations made by in-house and
ECOsystems report--recommendations for the correction of
situations that local air operations management had obviously
28
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recognized, and had been unable to correct because of lack of
support from higher management levels.
Tne ASAP has followed "example" relationships between the
Centers and Headquarters including direct participation in
several accident investigations. Center performance, as observed
by ASAP was much improved, yet little commendation and much
criticism appeared to be the character of comments from
Headquarters. A more permanent Headquarters "focus for flight
safety" should alleviate this problem.
29
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Appendix 2
UPPER STAGES
Inertial Upper Stage
The first flight of the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) from the
Shuttle failed to put the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
System (TDRSS)-A spaceraft in the planned geosynchronous orbit.
At the end of the IUS second burn, the IUS-1/TDRSS-A stack was in
an orbit with a perigee some 7500 n.mi. lower than planned and in
an uncontrolled tumble at about 30 rpm. The spacecraft was
separated as a result of a command from the ground and, by means
of the attitude control system thrusters, was stablized and
subsequently raised to the desired orbit.
An intensive investigation was conducted and the multiplicity
r	 of anomalies were sorted out. Most of the anomalies were the
consequence of a major malfunction. This malfunction was the
uncommanded second stage solid rocket motor nozzle displacement
that occurred at about 83 seconds into the planned 107 second
burn. The IUS control system was unable to regain control of the 	 {
nozzle positioning during the remainder of the burn despite
issuing the command for maximum restoring action and achieving
maximum actuator electrical current. After the completion of the
motor burn, the nozzle responded to command with correct
response. This large deflection of the nozzle caused the
observed tumbling.
The investigation concluded that the most probable cause of
the malfunction was a failure of the motor "Techroll" ioint such
that the resultant rapid loss of fluid from the "Techroll" seal
lead to the collapse of the seal. In such circumstances, the
nozzle would be held in a cocked position by the motor chamber
pressure load on the collapsed seal. At the completion of the
motor burn the chamber pressure load is eliminated and the
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restraining forces on nozzle motion are removed. By making the
assumption of such a joint failure it was possible to replicate
the flight data in a computer simulation giving credence to the
hypothesis.
The exact cause or mechanism of the failure is still under
investigation. Evidence to date indicates that a mechanical
failure of the sea]. induced by one or more thermal protection
system failures is the most probable cause of the control
malfunction. As a consequence, an intensive review of the design
and quality assurance provisions for this subsystem has been
undertaken. In the absence of evidence of a specific fault
leading to the malfunction, it has been necessary to implement a
number of design changes to cover the spectrum of possibilities
that exists. The changes include providing redundant seals for
the fill and bleed ports of the "techroll" seal, providing
additional insulation to the thermal protection subsystem to
increase the design margin at several locations in the joint
area. At the same time tests are being conducted on the original
4
design in an attempt to isolate the cause of the failure. It is
anticipated that a redesigned and stringently qualified system
should become available by mid-1984.
0
Centaur
A 2-day fact-finding session covering the Centaur was
conducted in mid-July at the General Dynamics Convair Division
plant in San Diego, California. This session was the Panel's
introduction to the Centaur as a part of the Shuttle program.
Most of the organizations involved in the Centaur/Shuttle program
provided briefings or had representatives present to respond to
questions.
The Centaur program was in the midst of the design phase at
the time nf the visit. The conceptual designs had been adopted
and detailed design was well along. The series of formal design
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reviews were scheduled to begin in the last quarter of the year.
The test program had been outlined and some of the development
tests were in process.
The Panel's principal focus was on the safety implications of
carrying a cryogenic propellant rocket stage with
pressure-stabilized tanks in the Orbiter payload bay. In
general, it appears that the program has identified and attacked
the issues involved. Much attention has been given to safety
considerations in the design process. The subsystems are being
designed to satisfy the safety requirements stipulated for
payloads by the Shuttle program. In trying to satisfy these
f
^	 requirements, some of which are more demanding than those imposed
I	 on the Shuttle itself, some aspects of the fluid and avionic
systems of the Centaur became quite complex. A special review
was undertaken to determine if some simplification could be
achieved without compromising safety of flight. A Panel member
attended a meeting on the findings of this activity and found
that a thorough job had been done. There was general agreement
that the modified system designs were satisfactory but that some
waivers of requirements were required. This is occasioned by the
fact that for payloads " damage to STS equipment" is categorized
as a "catastrophic failure" regardless of the consequences of
such damage. As a failure mode that is classified " catastrophic"
is not permitted, additional redundancy is required and leads to
the overly complex systems encountered. The issue is being
pursued through the required channels.
The Centaur/Shuttle program ( Headquarters, JSC, LeRC, KSC)
provided detailed responses to Panel questions and comments
regarding the Centaur flight and fixed elements and their
integration into the Space Transportation System. This
continuing dialogue between Panel and program personnel provides
a sharing of the results of ongoing studies and decisions reached
in those areas that are of vital interest to the Panel.
AN,
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The Panel will continue to monitor the program actively as it
progresses. In particular, we plan to attend the several design
reviews, test program reviews and program reviews which are
scheduled during the coming year.
I^
I
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Appendix 3
PAYLOADS
With the focus of the Shuttle program shifting from
development and flight test to operational use, the Panel has
increased its emphasis on the review of the payloads to be
transported by the Orbiter. Summary observations on a number of
the payloads examined follow.
Orbital Refueling Demonstration
The Panel was represented at the first design review meeting
and at the Phase I/II safety review meeting for this project. As t
would be expected, the focus of safety concerns is the presence
of hydrazine in the experiment. Of principal concern are: The
possibilities of hydrazine leakage, adiabatic detonation, ullage
recompression, exposure of the crew to the propellant etc.
d	 ;
Much progress has been made since the first design review
1
meeting. Among the changes since the first meeting is the
elimination of all catalytic vents of the hydrazine side of the
system. Each potential hazard is being analyzed methodically and
the design is being scrutinized in a thorough manner to assure
that the system meets all NASA safety criteria. One open issue
is how to treat the possibility of an astronaut getting his EVA
suit contaminated with hydrazine and assuring it is clean before
entering the air-lock.
The system design is progressing well. There is a very good
team on the job. Much work remains to be accomplished prior to
the scheduled flight date. Continued thoroughness of design and
safety review coupled with satisfactory completion of the test
program is required to reduce the risks to acceptable levels.
The Panel will continue to monitor this project.
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Spacelab
The Panel was represented in the Phase III safety meetings
which were the final safety reviews for Spacelab I. There
appeared to be great depth and thorough analyses of payload
safety as indicated by the representatives of the participating
centers.
It appears to the Panel that the project has been well
managed. The matrix format that was utilized was designed to
assure that each item was evaluated for individual hazards and
the consequence of each such failure on its system. Further,
interface analyses had been conducted to assure that each system
does not impact adversely on other systems and on the entire
payload. Final approval of the results of the review rested with
the STS project.
It is suggested that the Panel be kept informed about
schedules and plans for such safety reviews at their inception so
that it may begin to observe the process as early as possible.
With such early involvement, it would be possible to gain a
broader comprehension of the payload project and the issues that 	
tl^
arise thus permitting the Panel to render a more informed and, 	 N'
therefore, complete assessment.
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EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY
Suits and probreathi.ng
Extravehicular activity (EVA) is increasing as the STS
project reaches out with new and more sophisticated programs.
All EVA has been conducted to date using a 4.3 psi suit. As far
as the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is aware, all EVA 	 N
activities have been routine except for the first flight. The
current suit, because of its low operating pressure, requires an
y 
l extensive period of prebreathing of 1008 oxygen (up to 4 hours)
prior to attempting an EVA from a 14.7 psia cabin. This
}	 precaution is necessary to avoid decompression sickness (bends)
of astronauts when going EVA.
On mission 41 -B (STS-11) the cabin pressure will be reduced
from the normal 14.7 psia to 10.2 psia before initiating EVA to 	 I
acclimate the astronauts to the lower pressure. This allows
prebreathing time be reduced to about 40 minutes as well as
decreasing the astronaut's susceptibility to decompression 	 ^.
sickness.
For the future, research is being conducted on a higher
operating pressure suit at 8+ psi. This new suit design is to
have much greater flexibility in the shoulder, arm, and leg
joints, than that of the current suit. The neW design has the
capability of greatly reducing or eliminating prebreathing
requirements.
It is the view of Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel that as
time progresses there will be an increasing need for the higher
pressure more flexible suit. While current NASA plans may not
require this new design, we can visualize the increasing need for
it as missions become more complex and the Air Force begins to
36
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use the STS for its own missions. The ability to go EVA with
little or no prebreathing is a big plus. The greater flexibility
of the new design when combined with the proven torso of the
existing design should decrease workload of the astronaut and
reduce his susceptibility to decompression sickness.
We believe that NASA should foster the full development of
the higher pressure suit and when fully tested it should become
the standard suit for all future EVA activities.
Manned maneuvering unit
This short range versatile spacecraft, the manned maneuvering
unit (MMU), has been conceived for use as a controllable platform
which can transport an astronaut on a short radius from the
Orbiter payload bay to satellites near the Orbiter or to inspect
the external surfaces of the Orbiter itself. The purpose for the 	 i
transportation of the astronaut is to place a member of the crew
in a position to inspect, repair, and help retrieve satellites
whose orbits can be reached by the Shuttle. Sufficient control
power is designed into the MMU to permit the passenger astronaut
to use the thrusters on the MMU for controlling the motion of
a`.
randomly moving satellites and to tow them back to the Shuttle
for repair or return to earth.
The concept of the MMU and its systems, along with the
operational plans and developed capabilities, was reviewed by an
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel member at the contractor's plant
(Martin-Marietta in Denver, Colorado). In addition, the
simulator work, the facility, and the training program were also
described and shown. Simulator training was assessed along with
methods for coupling the astronaut to the Solar Maximum Mission
(SMM) satellite. Similarly, the adapter hardware and procedure
for attaching the MMU to the payload bay wall was viewed as part
n
of the total description of how the "space-suited" astronaut
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mounted the vehicle, detached it from the payload bay wall and
reattached it once the mission was completed.
From this individual but thorough review, the Panel notes:
a. The concepts of redundancy for critical systems are
consistent, the systems are simple and sufficiently
exposed to permit thorough inspection.
b. The cold gas thrust and attitude control system is
susceptible to pre-use inspection prior to
disengagement from the Shuttle bay wall.
1
it
y C.	 The gauge indicating energy available to the
G
thrusters was in a poor position for visual
monitoring while the astronaut was secured in the
1
unit's seat. It seemed feasible to move this gauge i
without destroying the integrity of the systems a
tests that have been run.
d. The training program has been developed
pragmatically along with the unit and appears to be
effective.	 After the first experimental flight 	 Gi
with the MMU this program and the formal
documentation should be reviewed again by the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
e. It was determined that no "safety" umbilical
(tether) is to be used for the first experimental
flights and is not contemplated for ultimate
operatioanl use. This appeared to introduce
unnecessary risk, but the astronaut
trainer-director for the program explained that
umbilical tangling and snagging represented a
hazard judged to be equally severe and that the
thruster system of the MMU did not have enough
38
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capacity, even if stuck in "full thrust", to move
the passenger out of range of the Shuttle
capability for astronaut rescue. Additionally, the
"buddy system" provides that a second astronaut in
the regular EVA suit will be there.
Based on discussions at the MMU Critical Design
Review held November 1983 an additional comment can
be made: If, for any reason, there are significant
amounts of dust/debris in the payload bay during
ground or flight operations, care should be i
exercised to prevent MMU pneumatic systems from
v
being contaminated which might adversely affect
tl	 their operation.
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LOGISTICS. MAINTENANCE, SPARES AND OPERATIONS
This discussion is based on three specific activities: (1)
General Abrahamson's meeting at Kennedy Space Center in November
1982, (2) attendance at a logistics telecon at Rockwell
International, Downey, California, in April 1983, (3) visit to
Vandenberg Air Force Base in October 1983. In addition, major
events have occurred during 1983 which have direct bearing upon
the subject:
a. Creation of the Integrated Logistics Panel (ILP)
and commencement of working liaison with Vandenberg
AFB. This is noted in a Program Directive, SSPM
No. 85A issued by JSC's NSTS Office, March 25,
1983.
b. Issuance of an Integrated Logistics Support Policy
(ILSP) for the National Space Transportation System
establishing a platform for (a) above.
C.	 The award to Lockheed of the Space Shuttle
Processing Contract (SPC).
The meeting at Kennedy Space Center convened by Gen.
Abrahamson on November 9, 1982 was the catalyst for the more
vigorous logistics, maintenance and support activities which have
gradually evolved during 1983.
The Integrated Logistics Support Policy is commendably
detailed with seven appendices: Management policy, spares
policy, maintenance and repair policy, logistics support
functions policy, ILS milestones, ILS definitions and ILS top
level documentation tree. It would appear that a number of
management level people in both NASA and USAF are looking to the
establishment of the Lockheed-managed SPC as a partial answer to
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9many logistics problems but, although the ILSP was produced
concurrently with the contractor-selection award process, the
directive does not cite an SPC role in this arena. It is too
early to be able to gauge the effect of the SPC program upon
logistics but clearly it must necessarily be heavily involved, at
both KSC and VAFB.
.	
With respect to the scope of the ILP task, there is concern
that it does not include logistics for the Spacelab, Centaur, IUS
and PAM elements. It certainly appears that only a complete
system ILS program, that is, including the vital payload
elements, would have the desirable result of ensuring that the
vehicle launch dates can be met from the support viewpoint.
The issue raised by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel in
earlier annual reports, namely, that of providing logistics
i
control by a single entity appears to remain for the future. The
cooperation and growing cohesion of the USAF-Vandenberg and the
NASA-JSC/KSC elements is very encouraging but the co-chairing
arrangements of the ILP, necessary as they may be at present, do
not make for efficient operation in trying to recover some of the
critical time lost over the past three years.
The task of the ILP is greatly complicated by the necessity
of trying to match the USAF well-developed organizational and
management systems with the equally well-established
"three-level" system at NASA. This results in a number of
organizational "wiring diagrams," interface and procedural
documents, few of which, at this writing appear to be completed.
While the issues of supply of components at the line
F	 replaceable units (LRU) level appear to be documented and
fi	 understood some of the necessary suppliers may not be funded.
Progress is most certainly being made in detail components but
f	 major units such as the SSME with its critical sub-assemblies
still are in need of a good, clearly established master plan.
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There is also the logistics aspects of transporting the SRB
segments to VAFB which are in need of reinforcement for which the
case for a third set of rail cars is being made.
Storage space at KSC for SRB segments is limited (although
VAFB seems to be better off in this respect) and there is clearly
a need for a study involving a "transportation model" to resolve
some of these issues before they become a trans-continental
transport crisis. In this general context the critical
dependency upon only one B-747 Shuttle ferry vehicle for
coast-to--coast movement should be re-examined.
Based upon our observed development of the logistics spectrum
over the past year it appears that:
a. Considerable progress has been made in trying to
gain control of the logistics problem.
Improvements in NASA's interest and organization
for Integrated Logistics System and sincere	 6
cooperation and coordination by USAF for the
projected VAFB operations are certainly showing
results.
w
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b. There still appears to be issues associated with
who has the responsibility for Orbiter, that is to
say between the USAF and NASA. (The Directive says
that the Air Force has responsibility for it
"on-orbit." This needs clarification.)
C.	 The "reporting to" functions of the Integrated
Logistics Panel (ILP) are still unclear. Should,
for example, the ILP report directly to the
National Space Transportation System Program
Office? Should the ILP functions also embrace
logistics aspects of operation and launch instead
of being limited as at present to supply and
1
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support tasks? The charter of the ILP, in spite of
well-written directives from NASA Headquarters and
Johnson Space Center is still unclear.
d. Considerable worry has been voiced throughout the
year about the lack of ILP access to the Spacelab,
Centaur, Inerital Upper Stage, and Payload Assist
Module systems and the question therefore arises:
is the ILP intended only to support Shuttle and not
the broad spectrum of NSTS which would include
these payloads?
e. The USAF view seems to be that they can't- see
anything in the NASA system at present which could
be recognized as a well-developed maintenance,
supply and logistics curriculum such as the USAF
have developed and refined over the years. On the
other hand, it appears that the evolving NASA
logistics programs are more suited to the special
problems of the small Orbiter fleet than the
highly-structured, large fleet concepts o the
USAF. Providing a workable accommodation between
these two opposing philosophies would seem to be a
pre-requisite for the ILP but it must be empowered
by directive to be able to bring about such a
foundation.
f. The "co-chairing" of the ILP by USAF and NASA is
clearly the only arrangement which could be
employed at this stage. Perhaps it is too early to
establish the function of an overall "czar" of
logistics but the difficulties which are beginning
to show up from this rather too democratic
co-chairing process could probably be
short-circuited by the early appointment of a
strong top chief with total authority.
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g.	 The role of the SPC in the entire scheme of things
needs to be determined and made visible to all
concerned as soon as possible if some of the
program's aspirations are to be realized.
a
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Appendix 6
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ELEMENTS
Orbiter Landing Speed and Pitch Control
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has, in the past, called
attention to major deficiences in handling qualities of the
Orbiter. These deficiencies are well known, highlighted by
substantial pitch gyrations during the Approach and Landing Test
No. 5 and some subsequent landings. Such control perturbations
have been examined by analysis and numerous simulator control
explorations. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel believes that
NASA top management should direct further exploration of the
significant benefits to be gained by major changes to improve the
pitch control of the Orbiter.
The latest information that the ASAP has found on this
problem is a report of the flight control system testing done on
the Ames Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS), entitled: "Evaluation
of the Space Shuttle Approach and Landing Flight Control System
Handling Qualities" by S. D. Griggs, R. J. Grabe, and S. R.
Nagel. This study, carefully conducted over a period of several
months, by competent engineers and pilots with extensive
experience in high performance airplanes and Shuttle simulations,
resulted in the following recommendations:
a. Do not replace the current Flight Control System with any
of the alternate systems evaluated. Some were found to be
slightly better, but not to the extent that a change to the
baseline system is warranted.
(I
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b. Investigate the feasibility of improving the low speed
handling qualities of the Orbiter through airframe modifications,
such as the addition of canard surfaces.
Eight different flight control systems were evaluated
including software modifications to filters, gains, feedback
paths, senor, etc. Ten pilots flew approaches to runways
simulating Dakar, Kennedy Space Center, and Edwards Air Force
Base. Disturbances were introduced during the approaches to
stimulate transients in sensor data, such as changes in radar
altitude, in azimuth from the microwave landing system, head/tail
winds, and reduced visibility return as in a breakout from low
(	 cloud deck. The Heads Up Display (HUD) was not used.
The results show substantial variations in touchdown point,
airspeed at touchdown, and vertical speed at touchdown (h1
Different software "improvements" failed to show significant
changes; -- and there were a number of "crashes". A "crash" is
defined as landing short or long or left or r:lght or with h
greater than 10 fps.
Pilot comments on the baseline system were:
"Easy to balloon under stress"
"If aircraft disturbed, end up hunting for ground"
"Cannot control aircraft precisely near ground"
"Lag between rotational hand controller (RHC) and
vehicle response causes over control for large inputs
and undercontrol for small inputs."
These comments on the performance of the recommended system
indicate that there is a basic pitch control problem in the
aerodynamic design of the Orbiter.
r
r
It appears that the attempt to combine pitch and roll control
0	 with lift augmentation by the use of elevons on a delta wing
f dA:
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results in compvomises that have penalized both pitch control and
lift augmentation.
The pitch control problem arises from the fact that, on the
landing flare, to reduce airspeed, the pitch up moment is
accomplished on the Orbiter by raising the elevons whicn
inherently decreases lift coefficient with loss of lift,
increasing the landing speed. The loss of lift is in response to
a control motion that a pilot normally uses to raise the nose and
increase lift! In addition, the inertia of the Orbiter is such
that the motion of the c.g. lags the control input by as much as
two seconds. The lag and apparent lift reversal can induce over
control, and, in some cases, sevor.e pilot induced oscillation
(PIO).
The use of canard surfaces to provide pitch control would
free the elevons to be used for lift augmentation and roll
control.	 The elevons would have to be limited in droop to
maintain adequate roll power but in spite of this, the available
increase in lift would be most significant. Estimating from a
nominal landing speed of 175 knots, angle of attack of 100,
elevon angle of 0 0 , produces an apparent lift coefficient of
0.41. Using the elevons as landing flaps with a canard trimmer
might produce double this lift coefficient with a possible
landing speed of 125 knots.
The above increase in lift coefficient is not impractical.
The advantages of such a landing velocity reduction are very
significant from a safety viewpoint:
a. Stresses on wheels and brakes are reduced
b. The risks of landing at Dakar or other short fields are
reduced, opening up many alternate abort sites
C.	 In the event of ditching in the open sea, the
probability of survival would be greatly enhanced.
A.
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One of the significant findings in the Ames Vertical Motion
simulator tests was an appreciation of the dangers of attempting
a high-weight low-speed landing (like an abort to Dakar). I£ the
angle of attack is increased much above 100 , in an attempt to
land slowly, the aerodynamic condition is one of "backside of the
L/D curve" where the induced drag rapidly decelerates the Orbiter
and increases the sink speed.
In addition to the safety aspects of low landing speeds, the
avoidance of pilot induced oscillation must be emphasized. To
the non-pilot, the term "pilot induced oscillation" is just that:
a disturbance that is felt to be controllable and transient. To
the pilots who have experienced it, including the astronauts, it
is recognized as a potentially uncontrollable instability. The
lack of a landing incident to date is a tri,". , te to the skills of
the astronauts, and to the carefully planned and executed
training program in high performance aircraft, the Shuttle
Training Aircraft, and simulators.
Space Shuttle Main Engine
The currant year began unauspiciously for the Space Shuttle
Main Engine (SSME) with the discovery of leaks in the STS-6
engines and the resultant delays in scheduled flights. There
were a number of intensive reviews of the problems and their
systems and management implications. Panel members participated
in several of these reviews. Corrective actions were devised and
implemented. Subsequently, the engines performed essentially as
predicted in all the flights this year. During the STS-8 flight
an Augmented Spark Igniter line failed during the shutdown
sequence. This had no effect on the mission. The cause of this
failure has been identified and corrective action implemented.
Because of the very limited life (one or two flights)
demonstrated by the turbomachinery during the FPL (109%)
certification test program and in the absence of near-term
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flights requiring that thrust level, it was decided to limit
planned flights to 1048 thrust. Such "derating" is a prudent
step. Not only does it provide added operating margin for the
SSME, it also should result in longer useable life for the
turbomachinery. This should mitigate the logistical problems
that would be caused by the need for frequent change-out of
turbopumps that are operated at 1098.
The SSME project has embarked on a three-phase program to
achieve a long-lived, reliable full power load (FPL) engine. The
first phase involves conducting certification extension tests at
1048 to obtain more data on durability at that thrust level. The
second phase comprises the orderly development, certification and
incorporation of a set of design-detail modifications aimed at
solving some of the problems encountered with the current FPL
design. The third phase includes major redesign changes. Among
them are: Redesign of the Hot Gas Manifold to eliminate 	 j
non-uniform flows and accompanying parasitic pressure losses;
elimination of injector baffles and shields, and increasing the
throat diameter of the nozzle. All of these changes will tend to 	 i
"unload" the turbomachinery thus providing greater operating
margins and, hopefully, extended useful life. Also included in
the plan are steps to provide new turbopump designs should the 	
r
preceding not prove effective.
The Panel supports this organized approach to solving the
problems of the SSME. Such a program is necessary to provide a
reliable engine for higher-power operation and to reduce the
logistic burden of frequent component removals.
The Panel would like to emphasize that it is important to set
the objectives of this improvement program in terms of
demonstrated margins of stresses, temperatures, loads, etc.,
rather than primarily in terms of time at a given thrust level.
Stipulating margins gives recognition to the fact that
time-to-failure curves are extremely sensitive to stress,
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temperature, etc., in the vicinity of the ultimate stress limits
of materials. This is especially true when materials are
operated at the high temperatures that prevail in the SSME.
Having demonstrated such improved margins by, among other
things, operating the engine at thrust levels above 1098 it is of
utmost importance to not fall into the trap of considering the
engine to be "rated" for operation at the higher thrust level.
What has been accomplished is to have demonstrated that there is
a margin for operation at 1098. To operate at the highest level
tested would be, in essence, to operate without margin.
The Panel will continue to monitor the progress in the
program during the coming year. 	 1
Orbiter Structural Integrity 	 t^
l^
t	 The Orbiter structure was designed to loads that have
p
acquired the name "ASKA 5.1." A later set of loads (now called 	 ^7
"ASKA 5.4"), based on revised aerodynamic and thermodynamic data, 	 pti
was used for the most current structural assessment. Flight data
u
analyzed to date (strain gage readings recorded on flights STS-1
through STS-5) have not shown reasonable agreement with predicted
strain for the same locations using ASKA 5.4 loads. Even though
these initial flights were designed to be as benign as possible,
the ASKA 5.4 predicted limit strain on the wing alone was
exceeded in:
a. 63 instances during ascent
b. 41 instances during descent
Fortunately, there were no instances where the measured
strain exceeded a safe allowable limit strain. The numerous
exceedances of ASKA 5.4 predicted limit strains without exceeding
safe limit strains could be due to:
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a. the ASKA 5.1 loads that were used for design were
more severe than the ASKA 5.4 used for assessment
in the areas where exceedances were measured
b. larger than minimum margins of safety were accepted
and used in the design.
Since flight development was officially concluded with STS-5,
the development flight instrumentation installed in OV-102 has
essentially been dismantled. There does not seem to be an
adequate plan to acquire the in-flight data required to close out
the discrepancies between flight and analysis data. Therefore,
the following steps should be taken:
a. Vehicle OV-102, which was the most densely
instrumented vehicle, should have all DFI
(Development Flight Instrumentation) gages
reactivated and duplicated on both sides of the
vehicle and should have adequate pressure
measurements added in order to establish a more
complete data base.
b. The initial flights were designed to be as benign
as possible. With the flight envelope being
expanded with each flight, instrumentation should
be required on all vehicles in order to safely
monitor future flights.
The failure of flight data to validate the current best
predictions of structural loads raises serious questions about
how the full strength of the Orbiter vehicles can be safely
exploited. The Panel views the present situation as follows:
a.	 ASKA 5.4 loads apparently do not have the correct
distribution of aerodynamic forces in the ascent
configuration.
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b.	 Current analytical prediction of internal loads and
identification of the most critical elements for
structural failures are not valid.
C.	 OV-103, OV-104 and OV-105 wing structure will be
more critical than earlier vehicles because of the
800 pounds of structural weight removed in a weight
reduction program. The reduction was based on
adhering to close margins on ASKA 5.4 loads which,
in some areas, were less than the ASKA 5.1 loads
	
d
used for the original design. Thus, the failure to 	 s
validate the ASKA 5.4 loads has particular
significance for these later vehicles.
d.	 Future plans include missions that can experience
118 more dynamic pressure (Q) on ascent and 608
higher heating rate on descent than has occurred on
STS-1 through STS-5. The best way to prepare to
safely fly the most severe mission should be
addressed.
Vehicle 6.0 Loads/Stress Analysis
Since the time that the ASKA 5.4 loads were derived (in
1976/1977), both flight and wind tunnel data have been developed
that should provide a better basis for generating loads that more
closely represent those being experienced by the full-scale
flight vehicles. It has been proposed that a new set of loads be
derived and used with an updated finite element model to provide
a basis for establishing safe structural limits for future
flights. This proposed effort has been called the 6.0 Vehicle
Loads/Stress Analysis.
The vehicle 6.0 loads/stress analysis would consist of a
complete update of the dynamic, thermal and mechanical loads math
models that takes into consideration all structural configuration
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changes resulting from the OV-103 weight saving efforts and other
Shuttle element (ET and SRB) modifications. The followng should
also be re-evaluated: aeroheating and thermal gradients,
aerodynamic and compartment venting pressure loads, weight
distributions, inertia loads, ascent trajectories, and the
effects of the redesigned landing gear metering pin. These
efforts should be coordinated with the latest wind tunnel and
flight test data results in order to establish a new internal
loads data base for ascent, descent, and landing conditions.
These loads would then be used as a basis for a new stress
analysis to establish the operational capability of the vehicle.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel believes that another
round of loads analysis of the 6.0 type is necessary in order to
safely utilize the full potential of the Orbiter structure.
Filament Wound Case (FWC) For Solid Rocket Boosters
Results of a full-scale hydrotest of two segments of the FWC
were reported at the Technical Interchange Meeting at Morton
Thiokol, Wasatch Division, on November 16-17, 1983. Full-scale 	 6
test specimens TFS 2 and TFS 3 were pinned together with proper
end closures and external tank/solid rocket booster interfaces
and successfully completed hydrotesting on October 21. The test
results are as follows:
a. The test ran four maximum expected operating
pressure (MEOP) cycles to 1050 psi with a final
test to 1478 psi without burst.
b. The fiber strength in TFS 3 was demonstrated to 442
KSI.
4'
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C.	 The factors of safety (F.S) were shown to be:
1.50 Factor of Safety in the membrane for TFS 3
1.42 Factor of Safety in the membrane for TFS 2
1.32 Joint Factor of Safety for All Joints
d. The test specimens show no signs of delamination or
wear.
e. All test objectives were met.
Two more full-scale specimens are scheduled to be hydrotested
to 1408 of maximum expected operating pressure by the middle of
January 1984. These tests if as successful as the tests of TFS
2/3, will provide adequate certification of the FWC structural
design.
Lightweight External Tank
Q
d
In last year's annual report the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel recommended that a nonlinear buckling analysis be performed
on the Lightweight External Tank (LWT) structure in the area of	 j
the LH 2
 tank where maximum compressive stresses are produced by
thrust from the Orbiter. This analysis has now been completed by
Martin-Michoud, and the method and assumptions have been reviewed
and approved by an independent consultant, Mr. David Bushnell, of
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company. The results show the LWT to
have a 608 margin of safety in compression above the design
ultimate load. This will add to the 26.58 margin of safety
between the design ultimate load and the design limit load. With
these analytical results in mind, the Panel is satisfied the LWT
is structurally stable for 1098 of SSM rated power level.
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Landing Gear Design
For many years the ASAP has been pointing out the
inconsistency of the landing gear design loads where the Orbiter
has departed from commercial design practice. Normal commercial
transport aircraft have built-in margins for the maximum loads
expected in landing and braked roll-out conditions since the
critical loads are normally refused take-off with braking and a
1/2g turn. Thus comparison with transports show:
	
DC-9	 L-1011 Orbiter
v
Max design load equals max stress
(8 max stress)	 1008	 1008
Braked roll-out (8 max stress)	 738	 588	 1008
Touchdown at loft/sec (8 max stress) 718	 348	 --
	
5ft/sec (8 max stress) --	 --	 1008
Static load (8 max stress) 	 48.48	 218	 38.78
Tire deflection (max Ldg Load) 	 338	 --	 668	
p^
I
In spite of the fact that brake energy (design) has been
based on abort landings at 240,000 lbs. there have been actual or
incipient brake failures on almost every landing even though
landing weights have not yet approached the design maximum valve.
A review of the brake energy utilized through STS-5 shows that
the pilots have been demanding ever increasing energy. STS-5
used an average of 35.54 millions of foot pounds with a maximum
on one wheel of 42.62 millions of foot pounds. This value
compares to the maximum energy for emergency use of 55 million
foot-pounds and a fuse setting of 42 million foot-pounds,
illustrating the marginal capacity of the brakes.
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It has been noted by Robert Rothi that the brake pedals
require a 75 # force to achieve maximum brake pressure of 1500
psi. This apparently is extremely difficult for the pilot to do
consistently because of the long, tiring mission and not applying
full force lengthens the stopping distance appreciably.
	 Here is
a PRIME situation to incorporate an "autobrake" system.
Autobrakes are currently in production use on the 747, DC-10,
DC-9, and other airplanes and the systems have been
well-developed. Adaptation for use on the Shuttle should be a
simple process and would relieve crew workload and result in
shorter, consistent stopping distances.
The brakes were initially designed for 3000 psi, but the
torque from the carbon -carbon rubbing surfaces peaked so high
near the end of the stop on dynamometer tests that B. F.
Goodrich, the brake supplier, was afraid of structurally failing
the stators and rotors. Hence, the addition of reducers and the
f
	
	
reduction of maximum brake pressure to 1500 psi to limit the peak
torque.
a	 ,
Repeating again some of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
recommendations, it is suggested that NASA:
a^
1	 ;
a. Seriously study the use of a longer nose gear strut
or the installation of an expanding nose gear strut
to relieve the roll -out loads in landing,
b.
Short of
extensive im
including:
a.
Similarly study the feasibility of a 4-wheel truck
main gear.
such a major change there are a number of less
provements that NASA should seriously address
Place the Shuttle main gear tires on a flat surface
on individual load cells at the end of a mission
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and record variation in load distribution across
the Shuttle. It appears that structural
c . deflections on landing must tilt the shock struts
outward loading up the inboard tires to higher
loads and causing those brakes to absorb more than
their proper share of the energies.
v
1
b.	 Move the main tire centerline inward toward the
shock strut about one inch and increase the tire
size as much as the diametral clearances will
allow, maybe H46x17-22, or bigger, with a 5 o
 bead
seat.
C.	 With the larger tire and internal wheel space
redesign the brake for greater energy and torque
capacity using structural carbon. Support the
brake on the axle near the inboard bearing to
minimize axle bending.
I
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APPENDIX 7
PANEL ACTIVITIES FOR CY 1983i
As in previous years, Panel fact-finding sessions have been
conducted on the average of four times per month for 1983.
'	 Members and consultants have during this same period visited
seven NASA centers and facilities (Ames Research Center, Dryden
Flight Research Center, Langley Research Center, Lewis Research
Center, Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center,
Kennedy Space Center) as well as NASA Headquarters, and numerous
NASA contractors. Although these have been focused on the Space
Transportation System, there have been a number of fact-finding
visits aimed at reviewing and assessing aeronautical operations
and attendant flight safety. The Panel has, where practical,
participated in a number of significant in-house reviews; e.g.,
Flight Readiness Reviews, various project hardware/software
technical meetings, STS Support Activities. Panel efforts have
been supported by the Panel Staff Director through in-depth and
continuous participation and reviewing of STS and other
program/project activities as well as aeronautical R&D and
administrative flight safety activities.
E
The breadth of Panel personal discussions goes from the NASA
Administrator and Deputy Administrator to Program Directors on
a
into the subsystem design and test personnel (the "hands-on"
people). Beyond this is the Panel's annual report provided to
the NASA Administrator, informal meetings with Congressional
staffs, and testimony before the appropriate House and Senate
subcommittees in January-Marcie period. Where requested, the
Panel provides individual support to special review teams such as
those looking at the Filament Wound Case for the Solid Rocket
Motor, Centaur/Shuttle Safety, and the Shuttle Main Engine
Assessment Group.
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APPENDIX 7 CONTINUED
SUBJECT: Panel Fact-Finding Sessions Calendar year 1983
Date
	 Location	 Attendance/Subject
1/28-29/83 KSC STS-6 Flight Readiness
Firing	 (Elverum/Grier)
2/4/83 Rocketdyne Div. STS-6 Flight Readiness
Firing	 (Elverum/Grier)
2/8/83 NASA Hg Annual Meeting,	 1982
Activities	 (Panel)
2/22/83 Hercules Corp. SRM Filament Wound Case
(Hedrick/Rothi)
3/2/83 Congress,	 DC Panel Testimony to House of
Representatives
3/3/83 KSC STS-6 Flight Readiness
Review	 (Battin/Grier)
3/16-17/83 KSC Launch Processing
Software/Hardware	 (Battin)
3/30/83 JSC STS Program
Management-/Mission Ops
(Hawkins/Grier)
4/4-8/83 JSC Mission ops, aircraft
safety,	 logistics for STS,
Logistics Panel,	 Space
Medicine	 (Parmet/Davis)
4/6/83 Rockwell, CA Integrated Logistics Panel,
Orbiter	 (McDonald)
4/14-15/83 General Dynamcis Shuttle/Centaur Level II
Reviews	 (Hawkins/Grier)
4/19-20/83 MSFC STS Projects	 (SSME,	 ET,
SRB), Spacelab,	 Space
Telescope, Filament Wound
Case	 (Panel)
i
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STS Logistics
Programs/Policy (McDonald)
Spare Shuttle Main
Engine/Orbiter (Himmel)
TDRSS Ops, Orbital
Communications
(Battin/Davis)
STS Autoland, Flight
Trajectories (Battin)
STS Autoland, R.TLS abort,
Crew Support (Davis)
Spacelab Safety Review
(Parmet)
Filament Wound Case
Status/Problems
(Hedrick/Rothi)
STS-7 Flight Readiness
Review (Himmel)
Special SSME Management
Review Team (Himmel)
Aviation Safety Inspection
Review Autoland Simulator
operation (Davis)
STS/Centaur Integration and
Ops (Panel)
Space Shuttle Pain Engine
(Elverum/Himmel)
Aircraft operational safety
(Davis)
Orbital Refueling Test
Program (Parmet)
Technical Interchange
Meeting, FWC (Hedrick)
Manned Maneuvering Unit
(Hawkins)
4/21/83	 NASA HQ
4/27-30/83
	
Rockwell, CA
5/25-26/83	 NASA HQ
5/31-6/1/83	 JSC
6/i-2/83
	
JSC
6/2-3/83
	
JSC
6/8-9/83
	
Hercules Corp
e;
6/10/83	 NASA HQ
6/14-16/83
	
KSC
6/27-30/83	 ARC
7/12-1.3/83	 General Dynamics
7/14/83	 Rocketdyne Div
7/25-28/83	 LaRC
8/11-14/83	 JSC
8/23-24/83	 MSFC
9/14/83	 Martin Marietta,
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9/13-15/83 NASA HQ Intercenter Aircraft
Operations Panel and NASA
Aircraft Operations
(Parmet/Davis)
9/28-30/83 KSC Launch Preparations, Shuttle
Processing Contractor
transition, Aircraft Ops
(Panel)
10/7/83 JSC STS-1 to -8 Biomedical
Symposium (Parmet)
10/18-19/83 JSC Shuttle/Centaur Fluid
Systems Safety Review RTG
power supply cooling/control
(Elverum)
10/19-20/83 MSFC Filament Wound Case
Technical Interchange
Review/Meeting	 (Rothi)
10/19-20/83 VAFB Integrated Logistics Panel
for STS	 (McDonald)
10/18/83 Congress,	 DC Informal meetings with
Senate Staff	 (Hawking/Grier.)
11/8-10/83 JSC Manned Maneuvering Unit
Critical Design Review
Orbiter Brakes,	 Cr•^w
Operations	 (Rothi/Davis)
11/10/83 MSFC SSME, ET,	 SRB Production
Quality Readiness Review
with contractors/government
(Grier)
11/16/83 JSC Orbital Refueling System
Safety Review (Parmet)
11/18/83 Brooks AFB, TX EVA medical status and
testing	 (Parmet)
11/18/83 NASA HQ STS-9 Flight Readiness
Review (Himmel)
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SSME 1098 Fated Power Level
Status (Hawkins/Grier)
Shuttle Processing
Contractor's Status
(Stewart)
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle,
Transfer OrLit Stage,
Tethered Satellite and its
operations, Inertial Upper
Stage status, activities
review (Panel)
Filament Wound Case Special
Committee Meeting (Roth)
Centaur Critical Design
Review (Himmel)
4'.
11/30/83
	
Rocketdyne, Div
12/2/83	 KSC
12/6/83	 NASA HQ
12/13/83	 Nat'l Res Council
12/1G/83	 Le RC
t
e4
r.i
4 . e.
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Appendix 8
PLANS FOR 1984
Panel Membership
A number of Panel membership changes are taking place at this
time occasioned by events in late 1983. As noted in the front of
this report, Robert D. Rothi's passing requires the selection of a
new member. Lt. General Leighton I. Davis completed his membership
term and has been retained as a consultant to the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel. Bob Rothi had taken General Davis' position on the
Panel. As a result of the selection of the contractor team which
included Lockheed and Grumman to perform Space Shuttle Launch and
Landing processing at Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberg Air Force
Base both Willis M. Hawkins and Ira Grant Hodrick have retired from
the Panel. They are remaining with the Panel in a phase-over
period to accomplish a smooth transition to new members recently
appointed in their stead.
Mr. John C. Brizendine former President of the Douglas Aircraft
Company, now an aerospace consultant, has been selected to succeed
n
Willis Hawkins as the new Chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory	 a '.
Panel. A brief resume follows:
Juhn Brizendine completed 33 years with the Douglas
Aircraft Company in May 1983 after trying his hand at
teaching at the University of Kansas after college
graduation. His career included flight test work on a
series of high performance research and development,
military and commercial aircraft. This culminated in his
promotion to Executive Vice President and then President
of Douglas Aircraft Company in 1973. John served in the
Navy as a Naval Aviator with single and mulit-engine
ratings.
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Mr. Charles J. Donlan has been selected to fill the vacancy
left by Grant Hedrick. A brief resume follows:
Charles Donlan had 37 years experience in research and
development activities with NASA and its predecessor NACA
before retiring in 1976. Most of this time was spent at
Langley Research Center with the last 8 years spent at
NASA Headquarters. Since leaving NASA he has been a
consultant to the Institute for Defense Analysis with
emphasis on assessing and making recommendations to the
DoD on the development of facilities for the space Shuttle
operations. His NASA/NACA experience included high speed
research aircraft programs and direct involvement with all
aspects of manned space flight since the beginning of such
programs.
The selection of a candidate to fill the remaining membership
position will be made in the very near future.
Panel Activities in 1984
Plans are to continue to focus on a number of aspects of the
Space Transportation System as it approaches full operational
status, assess the safety implications of upper stages and
payloads that interface with the STS and to monitor the safety
procedures and practices of NASA's aircraft operations.
Efforts will include at least the following areas of interest
and concern:
o	 Shuttle Processing Contractor progress
o	 STS logistics and associated operational
implementation
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- Orbiter
SSME
- Solid Rocket Boosters
External Tank
Launch Processing System at KSC and VAFB
o	 Vandenberg Air Force Base operations and
relationships with KSC
o	 Upper stages including the inertial Upper Stage,
Centaur, Transfer Orbit Stage, Orbital Maneuvering
System
o	 Filament Wound Case for the STS Solid Rocket Motor
o	 Payloads and on-board experiments and their
integration into the STS, for example:
- Refueling Experiment
- Spacelab
- Tethered Satellite System
- Galileo
- Space Telescope
o	 Extravehicular Activity (EVA) and its support
systems including suits, manned maneuvering systems
and .life sciences
o	 Rendezvous and proximity operations in space
o	 The Solar Maximum Mission spacecraft repair flight
o	 Space Station
o	 Certification policy and its implementation
including product quality and design suitability,
as well as, use of analyses versus tests
o	 Operational procedures to promote safety in the
STS, space station and other programs
o	 Safety of NASA aircraft operations
MO,
V	 '.
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AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY
PANEL
I
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rAEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL
CHAIRMAN
Mr. Willis M. Hawkins (Retiring Chairman)
Senior Advisor Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Mr. John C. Brizendine (Incoming Chairman)
Formerly President, Douglas Aircraft Company
MEMBERS
Dr. Richard H. Battin
Associate Department Head
Charles Stark Draper Lab. Inc.
Mr. Charles J. Donlan
Formerly, Deputy Associate Adminstrator for
Manned Space Flight NASA
Mr. Gerard W. Elverum, Jr.
Vice President-General Manager
TRW Space and Technology Group
Mr. Herbert E. Grier
Formerly, Senior Vice President
EG&G Inc.
Mr. Ira Grant Hedrick (Retiring Member)
Presidential Assistant for Corporate Technolgy
Grumman Aerospace Corporation
Mr. John F. McDonald
Formerly, Vice President-Technical
TigerAir, Inc.
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Mr. Norman R. Parmet
Formerly, Vice President
Trans World Airlines
Mr. Robert D. Rothi (deceased)
Formerly, Chief Design Engineer
Douglas Aircraft Company
Mr. John G. Stewart
Assistant General Manager
Tennessee Valley Authority
CONSULTANTS
Lt. Gen. Leighton I. Davis
USAF (Ret.)
Dr. Seymour C. Himmel
Formerly, Associate Director,
Lewis Research Center
EX-OFFICIO MEMBER
v
Dr. Milton A. Silveria
NASA Chief Engineer
NASA Headquarters
STAFF
Mr. Gilbert L. Roth
Staff Director, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Ms. Susan Webster
Advisory Committee Assistant
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f	 ACRONYMS A ABBREVIATIONS
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
t
i
1
AMO Aircraft Management Office
ASAP Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
ASKA Automatic Systems for Kinematic Analysis
DFI Development Flight Instrumentation
EVA Extravehicular Activity
FASCOS Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
FAMOS Flight Acceleration Monitor Only System
FRR Flight Readiness Reviews
FPL Full Power Level
HUD Heads Up Display
ILP Integrated Logistics Panel
IAOP Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel
IUS Inertial Upper Stage
ILS Integrated Logistics Support
JSC Johnson Space Center
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LPS Launch Processing System
LWT Light Weight Tank
LRU Line Replaceable Units
LaRC Langley Research Center
Le RC Lewis Research Center
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
MMU Manned Maneuvering Unit
NACA National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NSTS National Space Transportation System
OMI Operati>-s and Maintenance Instructions
OV Orbiter Vehicle
PAM Payload Assist Module
PIO Pilot Induced Oscillation
RPL Rated Power Level
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RHC Rotational Hand Controller
SMM Solar Maximum Mission
SPC Shuttle Processing Contract(or)
SRM Solid Rocket Motor
SSME Shuttle System Main Engine
STS Space Transportation System
TDRSS Tracking Data Relay Satelite System
USAF' United States Air Force
VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base
VMS Vertical Motion Simulator
P
W
a
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